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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH, In the Interest
of

Case No. 7559

LYNN LUEORN CHRISTENSEN,
Alleged Delinquent Child.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The appellant has adopted as his Statement of
Facts excerpts from the transcript of testimony and
insofar as the testimony sets forth material facts, they
are adopted by the respondent. However, it is deemed
advisable to set forth a more detailed statement of
the facts which give rise to this appeal.
On the 21st day of February, 1950, Lynn Lueorn
Christensen appeared before the Ron. Sterling R.
Bossard, Judge of the Juvenile Court of the Fourth
Juvenile District in and for the County of Sanpete,
State of Utah, on a petition for delinquency which
alleged that the child had committed certain acts which
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

would constitute him a delinqu·ent child. At the hearing on February 21, 1950, the child Lynn Lueorn Christensen was found to be delinquent and was ordered
on probation (R. 8) The p·resent appeal does not
contain a record of proceedings had on the 21st day
of February, 1950. However, the repqrt and the
petition of the probation officer alleges these facts
which are not transversed by the ap·pellant 'and may
be accepted as true. Further, there is no record of
an appeal from the judgment of February 21 and
the findings that the child was delinquent may be
deemed for the purpose of this appeal to nave become
final. The p·resent case arises upon a Report and
Petition of the Probation Officer for Rehearing of the
Case and a Modification of the Order. The petition
alleges that the child has viol ated the order of probation in this: that he "did on May 10, 1950, and on
several other oc-casions, ~teal a bicycle belonging to
B·eth Stewart of Ephraim, Utah; that he did damage
the tires and the seat of said bicycle ; that he had the
bicycle without ·permission of Beth Stewart and her
family; that during the past few weeks on several
ocea.sions, said child did unlawfully enter class rooms
in the Jr. High School, even after being advised not
to enter; said rooms were not s-chool rooms in which
said child has classes; that he has unlawfully on
different occasions during the past few weeks, entered
the girls' dressing room unlawfully and that he has
'also on different · occasions made indecent advances
1
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toward girls in the First, Second, and Third Grade
of Elementary School; that the above actions are
similar to those of which said child has been accused
during the past year and s aid child ha·s been warned
against continuing- such action" (R. 8).
1

On the 12th day of May, 1950, the child appeared
before the Honorable S. R. Bossard, Juvenile Judge
of the Fourth Juvenile Court in and for the County
of Sanpete, State of Utah. It appeared that service
had not been made upon the parents of the child
48 hours p·rior to the time of the hearing hut that the
father Orval Christensen and the child had voluntarily appeared before the court; the court advised
the father of his legal rights and the father asked that
he be permitted time to get the services of an attorney
and to be properly served. It was then ordered that the
matter be set for hearing on the 1st day of June, 1950,
at 3:00 o'clock (R. 9-10).
At the hearing of February 21, 1950, the child
was placed on a suspended commitment to the State
Industrial School and was placed on probation for
further supervision and study (R. 9).
1

On the 2nd day of ~une, 1950, Judge Sterling R.
Bossard entered a decree and judgment providing
that ''subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the
court, the said Lynn Lueorn Christensen is hereby
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committed to the Utah State Industrial ·School until
he reaches the age of twenty-one ( 21) or is sooner
discharged by due process of law; S'aid commitment
to be for further sup,ervision and treatment;" (R. 21).
It is from this Order that the appellant takes
his appeal to this court.
STATEMENT

~OF

POINTS

I.

THE VISION OF THE CHILD IS DEFECTIVE.

II.

WITNESSES IN THIS CASE ON THE PART
OF THE STATE WERE NOT SWORN.

III.

THE COMPLAINT DOES NOT STATE A
CAUSE OF ACTION.

IV.

APPELLANT''S POINTS IV, V, VI AND VII
WERE NOT ARGUED IN APPELLANT'S
BRIEF AND THEREFORE THEY ARE
DEEMED -WAIVED.

V.

APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT WITH REGARD TO APPE,LLANT'S P·OINT VIII CONCERNING ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE
CO·NSISTS OF NOTHING MORE THAN A
NUMBER OF CITATIONS OF AUTHORITIES AND IS N'OT SPECIFIC AND THEREFORE SH.OULD NOT BE CONSIDERED
BY THE COURT.
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ARGUMENT
I.
The Vision of the Child is Defective.

A perusal of the record indicates that the only
reference to the defective Yision of the child is made
in a letter written by Dr. H. H. Ramsay, M.D., Superintendent of the Utah State Training School, American
Fork, Utah, which \vas admitted in evidence as Exhibit ''A'' over the objection of the appellant. Were
the child in this case being committed to the State
Industrial School for the sole reason th,at he was
retarded in school, appellant's contention with regard
to the vision of the child being defective might have
some merit. AppeYant states in his brief on page 27,
"there is no mention of the fact that the boy's vision
is bad, or that he cannot read well in the complaint
or petition, and it was not an issue in this case excep~t
that it was made an issue over the objection of the
defendant.'' Appellant does not point out wherein
the vision of the child was made 'an issue, and respondent is unable to determine that such fact was an issue
in this case. Findings of Fact make no mention concerning the defective vision of the child. The court's
findings that
''School is quite difficult for said child, especially the 8th grade work which he has been
trying to do. S'aid child does have some ability
when working with his hands. He is unable to
read above a third or fourth grade level.''
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which is supported by the sworn testimony of Glen
Bartholomew ( Tr. 37-38).
We respectfully submit, therefore, that plaintiff's
Point I with regard to the vision of the child is without merit and that the child is not being committed
to the Industrial School because he has poor eye sight.
II.

Witnesses in This Case, on the Part
of the State, Were Not S~orn.
With the exception of the question ·asked by Mr.
Larson, appellant's attorney, and addressed to the
court, ''Isn't the Court swearing these young witnesses~" (Tr. 100), no reference is made in the record nor was any objection raised by appellant because
the witnesses were not sworn. Marie Dodge, who was
13 years old, was placed under oath after the Court
explained that he felt that the young witnesses do not
a'P'preciate the meaning of an oath (Tr. 100). Thereafter when Rue Nielson was called as a witness (Tr.
111), and when Charles Nielson was called as a witness (Tr. 115), appellant's attorney did not have these
young witnesses sworn. Particularly no objection was
raised at any time during the state's case by appellant
with regard to the swearing of child witnesses. It is
fun dam en tal and too well settled in this jurisdiction to
require citation of authorities, that objection cannot
be raised for the first time on ap:peal. If Mr. Larson
had objected -at the time the young witnesses were
called, the court could have made a dete-rmination as
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to whether it \vas advisable or necessary to swear
these \Yi tnesses.
'Ve submit that the appellant has waived any e~ror
with regard to the swearing of the witnesses because
he proceeded \Yith the hearing \Yithout objection. Newco;nbe v. Wood, 97 lT.S. 581; 24 L. Ed. 1085. It would
appear, therefore, unnecessary for the court to make
a determination on this appeal a.s to whe~ther a Juve- .
nile Court must place children under oath before they
can testify. Suffice it to say, and we submit to the
court that this objection cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal, ,p,articularly in view of the ract that
the ap1}ellant after not objecting has waived that defect.
Appellant points out in his argument under this
point that Exhibits "A" and "B" were admitted in
evidence over his objection. H·owever, the objection
was made on the grounds
''That is not proper, it's irrelevant and not
within the issues involved in this particular
case.''
True it is the court overruled this objection and
allowed the introduction of the letter from the Training School, Exhibit ''A'' and the letter from the Superintendent of Schools, Exhibit "B" into evidence.
Appellant has failed to point out wherein the introduction of these two letters into evidence was ·p~rejudi
cial to the child. The first letter, Exhibit "A", written
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
by Dr. H. H. Ramsay, Superintendent of the Utah
State Training School was a report made with regard
to the physical and mental condition of Lynn Lueorn
Christensen. No finding of fact was based upon this
evidence a.nd it is respectfully submitted that the
rights of the child were not prejudiced by the introduction of irrelevant evidence.
With regard to Exhibit "B", a letter signed by
Lel~and E. Anderson and sworn to before Sterling R.
Bossard, Judge, the court's finding of fact with regard
to the testimony of Leland E. Anderson was based
in part upon Exhibit "B" (R. 17). However, Mr.
Anderson, when called as a witness by appellant did
testify with regard to Lynn Lueorn Christensen's
mental aptitude (see Tr. 94), wherein the following
testimony was recorded:
"L·ARSON: Has Lynn's wrongful conduct been
called to your attention~
''ANDERSON : All I know is his record, in fact
I am the one who gives the I.Q. tests to the
district, and also give progressive activity tests.
This is in the first, :fif,th, sixth, and eleventh
grades. I know the record very well.
"LARSON: Lynn 'probably is behind in mathematics as other students are~
"ANDERSON: Academically, he's quite slow."
Section 14-7-25, Utah Code Annotated 1943, p~ro-
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vides 1n part that :
'' * * * * The court may hear evidence in
the absence of such children, and may compel
children to testify concerning the facts alleged
in the petition. The court shall inquire into
the home environment, history associations and
general condition of such children, 1nay order
physical and mental examinations to be made
by competent physicians, psychologists and
psychiatrists, and may receive in evidence the
verified reports of probation officers, physicians,
psychologists or p·sychiatrists concerning such
matters.''
It is submitted that in view of this section that the
receiving into evidence of the sworn statement of
Leland E. Anderson, which Inerely sup~ports the sworn
testimony, was not prejudicial error.
III.

The Complaint Does Not State a Cause of Action.
The appellant in his statement of points apparently
argues that the "complaint" or petition does not state
a cause of ·action. Numerous statements are made,
none of which point out clearly wherein said complaint fails. Ap.p~ellant apparently takes the view that
the petition does not co-ntain all -of the essential elements necessary in order to bring the ·child properly
within the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court. Section
14-7-13 provides as follows.
'~ The petition shall be verified; alleging
briefly and in a g~neral way the facts which
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bring the child within the jurisdiction of the
court, stating the name, age and residence of
the child; the names and residences of his parents, (a) of his legal guardian, if there is one,
(b) of the person or persons having custody
or control of the child, and (c) of the nearest
known relative, if no parent or guardian can
be found. If any of the facts herein required
are not known by the petitioner, ~the petition
shall so state.
"The proceeding shall be entitled. 'State of
Utah in the interest of_____________________________________________ _
delinquent child' (or a dependent or neglected
child, or a child otherwise within the jurisdiction of the court, as the case may be.) ''
This section obviously refers to the proceedings
which initially are instituted in order to bring a child
within the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court. In this
case, however, Lynn Lueorn Christensen was on the
21st day of February, 1950, adjudged to be a delinquent child and committed to the Utah State Industrial School until he reached the age of 21 or was
sooner discharged by due process of law. The execution of the order was suspended until May 15, 1950,
at which time the actions of s:aid child were to be
reviewed to determine whether further treatment was
needed (R. 15). The Report and Petition of Probation
Officer for Rehearing of Case and Modification of
Order alleges that the child violated the order of
probation. In the Order for hearing dated 12th of
May, 1950, and signed by the Court (R. 9) the court
stated that ''the child was placed· on a suspended com-
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mitment to the State Industrial School and placed
on probation for further supervision and study.''
'Vhile nothing in the record now before this court
indicates ""hat the exact terms of the p~robation were,
it must be assumed from a reading of the report and
petition (R. 8) that the actions of the child set forth
in the petition \Yere a violation of his probation. The
statutory provisions of Title 14, Utah Code Annotated
1943, do not set forth in specific language what type
of proceeding must be had once a child has been adjudged delinquent and placed on a suspended commitment or probation.

In the case of Stoker v. Gowans (1915), 45 Utah
556, 147 Pac. 911, this court upon ap~peal from the
judgment of the district court denying a writ of
habeas corpus discuss·ed the powers and duties of the
Juvenile Court and held :
"We thus have an act which practically confers parental powers and duties upon the Juvenile Court. How can another court thus be
called on to review every act of the juvenile
court which may in some way and by some
parents or guardians be considered inimical to
the· delinquent~ Moreover, how can :a law be
framed so as to define and provide for every
act the court shall take or order that it shall
or may make respecting the care, custody, control, or conduct of all delinquent children~ To
attempt this would be as impossible :as it is
imp~ractical. It seems to us that by suspending
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the supposed sentence the court did no more
than if it had in the first instance committed
Fern to the custody of the ~probation officer,
and had required her to report to the court
from time to time, and had thereafter, upon
application of such officer, modified the original
order or judgment by ordering her committed
to the Industrial School. The only difference
is that the court made the order of commitment upon the first hearing, and then conditionally suspended its operation. and, after the
probation officer made application to the court
in which he alleged that Fern had violated the
conditions hnposed by the court upon which
sentence was suspended, then ordered that she
be committed. The pvroceeding may have been
somewhat irreg~ar, but, under the provisions of
the law, it w:as not void''. (Italics added.)
After discussing other points, this court affirmed
the order of the district court, denying the writ of
habeas corpus. In this case, as in the Stoker case,
the court made an order of commitment upon the
first hearing and conditionally suspended its operation. Also it appears here, as in the Stoker case,
that the child violated conditions imposed by the court
on which sentence was suspended. It is therefore
respectfully submitted that the action of the Juvenile
Court in committing Lynn Lueorn Christensen to the
Utah State Industrial School, while there may have
been some irregularity, is not void.
No case has been found in which this court has
discussed the question as to whether a juvenile once
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committed to the Utah State Industrial School and
having had his commitment stayed and being p~laced
on probation is entitled to a hearing. The reasoning
of ~Ir. Justice 'Yolfe in the concurring opinion in
the case of Christensen v. Harris (1945), 109 Utah 1,
163 Pac. (2d) 314-318, discussing the question of
revocation of a suspended sentence in the criminal
case may readily be applied to the situation now
before this court. There it was said:

''In probation as in parole the defendant is
convicted and has only conditional liberty. When
a law intended to benefit a convicted defendant
is so construed as to require formal pleadings,
right of counsel, formal hearing with. all the
judicial trimmings and right of appeal just to
insure against the possible rare case of arbitrary
action ~y a judge; it goes . a long way to dis
courage a judge from granting probation and
defeats the salutory purposes of the act. A
judge may feel in a doubtful case that if he
tries p~robation, the convicted defendant will be
put in. such strategic position as to virtually
defeat needed revocation. I have expressed my
willingness to go along with the Zolintakis case
if it is construed only as requiring that before
probation is revoked the probationer be given
a he:aring on the question of whether he has
violated the ·conditions of his probation. I do
not think he need be notified in writing as to
the facts relied upon for revocation, nor that
he is entitled to counsel, nor that the hearing
be formal. A hearing implies a right to present
relevant evidence. I think the right to examine
4
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and cross-examine witnesses is largely in such
type of case in the discretion of the judge who
granted probation. The intent of the law was to
give the judge a supervisory jurisdiction over the
probation and if we are to adhere to the holding
that the defendant is entitled to a hearing, we
should hold that it is in the nature of an inquiry,
the nature and extent of which is largely in the
discretion of the judge. The judge could call
in the probationer, question him on matters
which were brought to the judge's notice by
others. Whether the probationer should be confronted by those witnesses is within the choice
of the judge. The inquiry need not extend
beyond an informal hearing and certainly need
not be expanded into a formal trial. It is not
to be presumed that the judge will be arbitrary.
It is to be presumed that he will act on a
reasonable fa.ctual basis. The judge had absolute discretion to grant or refuse probation.
If we hold that he has a limited discretion in
revoking, I think we · are going beyond what
the statute intended but certainly with a right
of appeal, the rights of the probationer which
we have judicially given him are sufficiently
protected without hold:i.ng that he is entitled to
all of the formality and procedure which due
process may require in the case of a man
charged but not convicted of a erime. It seems
to me the appeal should be limited to determine
only whether the trial judge was arbitra.ry in
revoking the suspension. And if he accorded
a hearing on reasonable notice and reasonable
opportunity to the defendant to p·resent his side
of the story, the judge could not be said to have
been arbitrary at least in regard to procedure.''
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As in the case of a criminal on probation, it
·would seen1 that the rights of a child who has been
adjudged a delinquent, are amply protected if he is
given a hearing in which he has the opportunity to
present his "\Yitnesses and to be confronted by witnesses,
with the right of cross-examining such witnesses with
regard to the violation of his probation or the condition of a suspended commitment to the Industrial
School.
In the petition (R. 8), Mr. Calvin M. Kempf
stated that he (Christensen) did "on May 10, 1950,
and on several other occasions, steal a bicycle belonging to Beth Stewart of Ephraim, Utah; that he did
damage the tires and the seat of said bicycle ; that
he had the bicycle without permission of Beth Stewart
and her family;'' Even assuming that the child would
be entitled to a formal hearing on a petition to modify
an order of commitment, we submit that the petition
sufficiently advises the child as to the charge made
against him with regard to the bicycle to enable him
to answer the same.

Section 14-7-25, Utah Code Annotated 1943, with
regard to proceedings before the Juvenile Court provides:

'' * * * The court may conduct the hearing in an informal matter and may adopt any
form of procedure in such cases which it deems
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best suited to ascertain the facts relating to
such case and to make a disposition in the best
interests of such children and of the public * * *. ''
In view of this provision, it is submitted that it
matters not that the probation officer denominated
the taking of the bicycle as "stealing a bicycle", and
further conceding that what the child, in this case,
did was ''nothing more than riding of a bicycle
around a school yard'', such action on the part of
the child would seem to be in violation of the Order
of probation, particularly in view of his action in
damaging the tires and the seat of the bicycle.
The court in its findings of fact stated (Tr. 16):
"Further testimony was given that a bicycle
belonging to Beth Stewart had been taken on
different occasions and the seat and tire cut
and ruined by a knife. The evidence was conflicting, although it a~ppeared to the court that
the testimony did show that the bicycle was
taken by Lynn Christensen and damaged by
him. ·Also, there was no provocation for taking
or damaging the bicycle. By the evidence, it
was shown that although said child, Lynn
Christensen, denied taking .the bicycle or damaging the tire or seat, he and his father did
replace the tire with a new one.''
We submit that this finding is supported by the
evidence even though such evidence was, as stated by
the court, in conflict. See testimony of Richard Wright
( Tr. 42-48) ; and testimony of Michael Lund ( Tr. 50).
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The finding of the court that the bicycle was taken
by Lynn Christensen and damaged by him is further
supported by the uncontroverted testimony of Beverly
Stewart that he and his father did replace the tire
with a new one (Tr. 54).
The petition further states (R. 8):
"That during the past few weeks on several
occasions such child did unlawfully enter class
rooms in the Jr. High School, even after being
advised not to enter; said rooms were not
school rooms in which said child had classes.''
The plaintiff states that
"The statement that the child did unlawfully enter class rooms is merely a conclusion
and even the allegations of the petition are
not supported by the testimony." (Plaintiff's
brief, pp. 30-31).
The court found with regard to this matter:
''That he had told said ·child that he was
not to enter said class rooms after 3 :30 in the
afternoon; and that it was necessary on two
or three occasions to send him home for being
in said class rooms in violation of his order."
(R. 15 ).
This finding, we submit, is supported by
mony of Glenn Bartholomew:

~the

testi-

''BARTHOLOMEW: Well, one of the contacts
I've had with Lynn is the problem that I talked
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.

over with his mother about him leaving school
after 3:30.
''LARSON: He was there then~
''BARTHOLOMEW: I talked with Lynn about
this personally, about his leaving the building
at 3:30, and it was with the wishes of his parents that we have him come home at · 3 :30.
That's what we wanted him to do because we
felt that would probably help ·clear up some of
the difficulties with Lynn. We felt that considerable of his trouble has been caused because
of his idle time and hanging around school
with nothing to do. I have, a time or two,
had to send him home from school at 3:30. * * * ''
(Tr. 37).
This finding is further supported by the testimony
of Wayne Graser where he testified as follows:

"P. 0. KEMPF: What was your reaction when
you caught him~ The first time'
''GRASER: I asked him why he had not gone.
He said he didn't know. I don't know just
exactly what I said, but I told him that I
wanted him to get dressed .and get out of there
is a big hurry, which he did. By the time I
locked up or got ready to· lock up, he had left.''
(Tr. 79).
We submit to the court that the child's action in
having to he sent home several times at 3 :30 and
having to be sent out of the gymnasium whether
"unlawful" or not, was in violation of the conditions
of his parole.
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Appellant com!plains that ''there is no allegation
here to the effect that the parents are unfit, incom·petent, or that they have knowingly failed and neglected to provide for said child the proper maintenance, care, training and education required by both
law and morals.·" (Plaintiff's Brief, p. 31). It is submitted that no such allegation is necessary even on
original proceedings. The statute, Section 14-7-13,
Utah Code Annotated 1943, does not require such an
allegation; nor is it necessary that there be any allegation that a child has been tried on probation in the
custody of his parents or that said parents have
ever, either of them, been conviGted of a felony as
contended by appellant (Appellant's Brief, p. 31).
Section 14-7-31, Utah Code Annotated 1943, .provides :
''No ·child as defined in this chapter shall be
taken from the custody of its parents or legal
guardian without the consent of such parents
or legal guardian, unless the court shall find
from the evidence introduced in the case that
such parent or legal guardian is incompetent,
or has knowingly failed and neglected· to provide for such child the proper maintenance,
care, training and education contemplated and
required by both law and morals, or unless a
child, being a . ward of the court, has been
tried on probation in the custody of its parents
or legal guardian and has failed to reform; or
unless either parent, having full custody and
control over a child, or the child's legal guardian, has been convicted of a felony; or· unles~s
the court shall find from ·all the circumstances
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m the case that public welfare or the welfar~
of a child requires that his custody . be taken
from its parents or legal guardian."
Admittedly the Juvenile Court must find from the
evidence either that the .parent has knowingly failed
to provide the child with proper m·aintenance and care
contemplated and required by both law and morals,
or, shall find from all the circumstances in the case
that the welfare of the child requires that its custody
be taken from the parent. There is nothing in this
record to indicate whether the Juvenile Court made
such a finding in the original proceedings or not.
However, it is submitted that inasmuch as no appeal.
w.as taken that it must be presumed that the former
order of commitment was in all reS'pects regular and
that such a finding was made. The court did, however, conclude that "from the experience of said
child while on probation, he is not able to get such help
{specialized, su.pervised treatment) in his home or
in the community; it is therefore to the best interests
and welf~are of said child that he be committed to the
State Industrial School * * * and that the parents
of necessity be deprived of the care, custody and
control of said child.'' ( Tr. 19)
All of plaintiff's argument with regard to the
question as to whether the "complaint" states .a cause
of action assumes that a formal complaint in this
type of hearing is necessary. Such, we submit, is not
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the case. It is the contention of the respondent that
the fundamental issue decided by the Juvenile Court
was whether Lynn Lueorn Christensen h·ad violated
the terms of his probation and whether the suspended
commitment committing said child to the Utah State
Industrial School should be revoked. It is submitted
that ""hen considering any of the arguments of counsel for the appellant with regard to a cause of action
that there is sufficient competent material evidence in
the record to support the court's findings and conclusions that the child's probation should he terminated
and the order of commitment issued. The testimony
of the high school coach, Mr. Wayne Graser (Tr~
78-82) concerning the child's actions and his conduct
with a little girl is sufficient, we submit, to warrant
the revocation of the probation. The petition alleges
as one of the reas-ons that the child had violated the
order of probation was that he, Lynn Lueorn Christensen, "has also on different occasions made indecent
advances toward girls in the first, second and third
grade of the elementary school.''
IV.
Appellant's Points IV, V, VI and Vll Were Not Argued in
Appellant's Brief and Therefore Th·ey Are Deemed Waived.

It is fundamental that an appellant who assigns
errors must, .as a general rule, argue such errors or
otherwise they will be deemed waived. Plaintiff's points
IV, V, VI and VII were stated apparently as errors.
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However, no argument was made of such points either
in the Statement of Points or in that section of
plaintiff's brief denominated "Argument". In the case
of Felkner v. Smith (1931), 77 Utah 410 296 Pac. 776,
an assignment of error was made by the plaintiff but
was not argued in the briefs. The court there held:
''That assignment of error is not argued in
appellant's brief and, therefore, it is deemed
waived."
In the case of Sandall v. Sandall (1920), 57 ~tah
150, 193 Pac. 1093, the ap~·ellant assigne'd errors which
were not referred to in appellant's brief. The court
In discussing the question of such omissions held:
"Such omissions on the part of appellant
are in disrega,rd of the rules of practice of this
court and have been condemned by the decisions
of the court in every case with which w·e are
familiar wherein the objection has been seasonably made and relied on. To cite all the cases
so holding would require more space than ought
to be accorded an entire opinion in an ordinary
case. We cite a few, however, as a gentle reminder: Walker v. Cont. Ins. Co., 2 Utah 331;
·People v. P·eacock, 5 Utah 237, 14 Pac. 332;
. Herriman Irr. Co. v. Keel, 25 Uta,h 96, 69 Pac.
719; Warren v. Robison et al., 25 Utah 205,
70 Pac. 989; Beatty v. Shelly, 42 Utah, 593, 132
Pac. 1160; Egelund v. Fayter, and cases cited.
51 Utah 579, 172 Pac. 313; Holt v. Great Eastern
Casualty Co., 53 Utah 543, 73 Pac. 1168.''
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v.
Appellant's Argument With Regard to Appellant's Point
Vlll Concerning Admission of Evidence Consists of Nothing More Than a Number of Citations of Authorities and
is Not Specific and Therefore Should Not Be Considered
By the Court.

There can be no particular disagreement with
the rules set forth by appellant in discussing Point
VIII with regard to the admission of evidence. However, it is not pointed out wherein such rules are
applicable to the case at bar, and particularly there
is no specific error argued by counsel under this point.
The general rule is as stated in 3 Am. J ur. 296, Sec. 708 :
''The general rule that assignments of error
must be specific applies to assignments based
on the rulings of the trial court in regard to
matters of evidence. Thus, an assignment of
error in the admission or ·exclusion of evidence,
to be sufficient, must be specific and must
clearly indicate the particular rulings complained
of. It will not b'e considered where it does not
set out the testimony referred to with the
specific objection thereto, nor give the page of
the paper, book or record where it is printed
in its regular order.''
We submit, therefore, in view of the vagueness of .
the argument, and the fact that there is no specific
argument with regard to Point VIII, that the court
should not ·consider such point.
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CONCLUSION
In . conclusion the respondent respectfully submits
that the appeal herein presented is without merit and
that the Order of the court committing the child to
the Utah State Industrial School should be sustained.
While there are some irregularities, it is our contention
that they are not prejudicial to the rights of the child.
Respectfully submitted,

CLINTON D. VERNON,
Attorney General.
G. HAL TAYLOR

Assistant Attorney General.

Attorneys for Res,tp_1ondent.
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